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Abstract
One of the main objectives of transnational banking regulation over the past two decades 
has been the standardization of regulatory practices and the allocation of regulatory powers 
to minimize the regulatory burden for banks. The resulting division of labor between home 
and host country regulators strongly favors Home over Host; And the regulatory scope 
has continued to focus on entities rather than activities. This paper argues that this has 
created several blind spots in transnational regulation of fi nance. First, Home is unlikely to 
monitor and respond to risks that are unique to Host, even though they might emanate from 
activities of banks that are subject to their consolidated regulatory supervision. Second, 
Host, may have regulatory supervision over a subsidiary of Home’s parent company, 
but may rely on Home to exert regulatory controls. Moreover, Host has little regulatory 
leverage if the parent bank side-steps regulatory restrictions imposed on subsidiaries by 
engaging in direct lending practices, or by channeling capital through entities that are 
not subject to similar regulations. Second, the continued focus on entity based regulation 
ignores the fact that the core function of banks, maturity transformation, is increasingly 
performed by non-bank institutions that escape the existing transnational regulatory 
framework. Against this background, this paper proposes effect-based regulation, which 
gives Host the power to regulate any activity that has a systemic effect on its fi nancial 
system, irrespective of who undertakes it and where it is carried out. The paper uses the 
recent example of Central and Eastern Europe during the global fi nancial crisis to illustrate 
the failure of the existing regime. 
Keywords: EU banking regulation, financial crisis, transnational regulation, effect-based 
regulation, systemic risk, home-host country regulation
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Over the past two decades, the quest for integrating financial markets into 
a single global marketplace has produced a host of legal and regulatory 
measures aimed at taming national protectionism, easing access to 
foreign markets, and lowering the regulatory burden for financial 
intermediaries that operate trans-nationally. Based on commonly agreed 
upon prudential standards, home country regulation and supervision has 
become the core principle in the design of most regulatory structures. This 
principle, first established as the “Basel Concordat” in a series of reports 
issued by the Bank of International Settlement in Basel,2 has also informed 
financial regulation in the EU: Indeed, the European passport system--
which allows a financial intermediary that has been duly licensed in one 
member state to offer financial services and establish branch offices in 
other member states without requiring additional regulatory approval in the 
host state—can be viewed as a strengthening of the home-host country 
regulatory principle. 
This paper questions the soundness of this principle as the primary means 
for governing interdependent financial markets; it draws on the lessons 
from the global financial crisis, which has exposed the vulnerability of host 
countries’ financial system to regulatory abstinence by home countries of 
trans-nationally operating financial groups. This problem has become 
                                            
2 Note that the first “Report to the Governors on the supervision of banks’ foreign 
establishments” of 1975 stresses cooperation and makes only general recommendations 
for the allocation of supervisory authorities between home and host country. However, by 
1983 the notion that the parent company’s home regulator would exercise consolidated 
supervision over the banks’ worldwide operation, became well established. See 
“Principles for the Supervision of Banks’ Foreign Establishments” (May 1983). Host 
country regulators retained supervisory control over subsidiaries located in their countries 
and were encouraged to prohibit the operation of a subsidiary in the event they deemed 
regulatory oversight by the parent to be inadequate. Nonetheless, as anticipated by the 
Principles, vesting consolidated supervision over the international banking group with the 
parent has undermined host country supervision. All BIS documents are available at 
www.bis.org.  
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acute due to  increasing financial interdependence: As emerging markets 
in Eastern Europe and Latin America opened their borders to foreign 
financial investors they have witnessed large parts of their financial 
systems being taken over by foreign groups and capital channeled across 
their borders.3 This in turn has exposed these host countries to risks 
emanating from activities of these foreign financial groups. Even the UK—
with its long tradition of financial market development—has found itself at 
risk from parent banks in Iceland with extensive branch and Internet 
operations in the UK.4 In contrast, existing templates for transnational 
financial regulation as embodied in EU law or the Basel Concordat are 
primarily concerned with the opposite scenario—namely risks emanating 
from a host country’s failure to regulate a subsidiary to the parent 
company and its home market. Moreover, in a world of mobile capital, 
entity-based regulation captures only a fraction of capital flows—which can 
just as easily be channeled into direct lending, securities, or through 
unregulated financial intermediaries as through intra-group relations 
between parents and subsidiaries. 
To address the new risk pattern of interdependent financial markets, this 
paper advocates existing arrangements with bias in favor of home-country 
regulators and a strong focus on entity-based regulation be supplemented 
with effect-based jurisdiction. While there is still a need for consolidated 
regulation of financial intermediaries that operate trans-nationally, the 
global crisis has demonstrated that there is also a pressing need to 
                                            
3 To be sure, the fact that liberalization of financial markets exposes the new destination 
countries of foreign capital flows to the risk of financial crisis has been well established in 
the literature. See Graciela L. Kaminsky & Carmen Reinhart The Twin Crises: The 
Causes of Banking and Balance-of-Payment Problems, 89 American Economic Review, 
473 (1999) and more recently Carmen Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff Is the 2007 U.S. 
Sub-Prime Crisis so Different? An International Historical Comparison, Working Paper 
Harvard Economics Department, (2008). 
4 For details on this see The Turner Review: A Regulatory Response to the Global 
Banking Crisis. UK Financial Services Authority (2009) at 39. 
 4 
address the systemic effects the operations of these intermediaries have 
on markets other than their home country. Effect-based jurisdiction would 
allow countries to regulate financial intermediaries that have a material 
effect on their domestic financial markets irrespective of their domicile. I 
suggest that such an arrangement might also instill the kind of cooperative 
regulation of global financial markets that has so far eluded a regime that 
favored home over host country regulators. The intuition for this claim is as 
follows: Vesting host countries with effect-based regulatory powers 
changes the balance of power between home- and host-country regulators 
and increases the likelihood that interests of host countries will be heard 
and incorporated into the home country regulator’s objectives. Effect-
based host country regulation therefore does not necessarily multiply 
regulatory oversight; In contrast, the prevailing home-host country 
distribution of regulatory powers favors home country regulators and 
leaves host country regulators without much leverage to ensure that 
consolidated home regulators adequately account for the risks the growth 
markets of financial intermediaries subject to their regulation face as a 
result of their actions. I argue that effect-based regulation is also superior 
to centralized regulation in the hands of a supranational European 
regulator not only on grounds of political feasibility, but also as a matter of 
efficacy; this strategy better aligns regulatory authority with the allocation 
of costs in the event of regulatory failure. Moreover, it encourages greater 
attention by global financial groups to the impact their actions may have 
on the various domestic markets in which they operate: Should they wish 
to avoid the scrutiny of multiple regulators they will need to stay below the 
threshold that triggers effect-based regulation or incorporate the concerns 
of host countries into their actions; Incidentally this can also be viewed as 
a strategy for addressing the too-big-to-fail syndrome. Within the 
European Union, such a regime will almost certainly require an 
amendment of existing banking directives. De lege lata, only in exceptional 
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circumstances will member states be able to exert effect-based jurisdiction 
in contravention of established home-host country regulatory structures on 
grounds of public policy exceptions incorporated in the Treaty and relevant 
directives (see infra Part 4). 
The analysis is presented in four parts: Part 2 discusses the limitations of 
home-host country regulatory divisions of labor in light of the global crisis,  
Part 3 develops the principles of effect-based regulation and assesses its 
likely impact on inter-regulatory cooperation drawing from experience with 
other regulatory regimes that accommodate multiple overlapping 
jurisdictions,. Part 4 analyzes the scope for effect-based jurisdiction within 
existing EU law and offers some critique of proposals for reforming the EU 
financial regulatory regime that are currently under discussion, Part 5 
concludes. 
2. Host’s Dilemma 
Host—for the purpose of this paper—is defined as a medium-sized 
country that has fully liberalized its financial markets. Three banks that are 
domiciled in the neighboring country Home (thus, they exist as foreign 
banks) own the majority of bank assets in Host. Host’s financial system 
grows rapidly for a while thanks to the strategies pursued by banks from 
Home: Home’s banks acquired local banks in Host, improved 
management structures, transferred capital and expertise and developed 
new markets—including consumer lending and corporate lending to firms 
that hitherto had little access to external sources of finance. Eventually 
regulators in Host suspect that the growth of the financial sector—
especially the pace of credit market expansion—might not be sustainable 
and may well trigger a financial crisis. Host therefore attempts to slow the 
expansion of credit by domestic financial intermediaries by imposing 
higher reserve requirements and administrative ceilings on the permissible 
credit volume per bank. To their surprise, they find that these measures 
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have little impact on the expansion of credits which continues almost 
unabated; Investigations suggest that domestic banks licensed in Host 
have by and large complied with the new restrictions, however, their 
parents located in Home have chosen to channel new credits not through 
them—i.e. their foreign subsidiaries—but instead to lend directly to 
customers in Host; in addition, some parents have established leasing 
companies and other vehicles that are not subject to Host’s banking 
regulations and thus proved unresponsive to the imposed restrictions. 
Regulatory authorities in Host inform Home’s regulators of these practices 
invoking a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that sets forth principles 
of home-host regulatory cooperation. Yet regulators in Home don’t share 
Host’s concerns: They point out that the transnational banks located in 
Home are well diversified with respect to the different markets they serve 
(i.e. they have operations not only in Host, but in numerous other countries 
throughout the region) and to the products they offer and they therefore 
see no reason to intervene. Within weeks of this exchange, international 
lending markets show severe signs of distress triggering a major 
contraction of credit globally. Banks from Home find themselves unable to 
raise capital on interbank lending markets to continue their expansive 
strategies in Host; indeed, as global financial markets grind to a standstill 
they cut back their lending activities—especially in foreign markets. Host 
thus experiences substantial outflows of capital, which plunges its 
economy into severe recession, forcing them to seek help from the IMF. 
The above scenario has been couched in hypothetical terms, yet closely 
resembles the experience of many Central and Eastern European (CEE) 
countries—including virtually all new member states of the European 
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Union,5 where foreign financial groups dominate the domestic banking 
systems; their assets comprise between 36 percent (Slovenia) and 97 
percent (Estonia) of total bank assets.6 Banking systems are also highly 
concentrated: As of 2005, the top five banks in key CEE countries had a 
market concentration ratio7 ranging from 48 percent in Poland to 99 
percent in Estonia:8 thus, a few foreign banking groups own most of the 
banking sector in CEE countries. Even for the largest country among the 
new member states of the EU—Poland—the importance of foreign owned 
banks to the domestic economy is far greater than the importance of it’s 
subsidiaries to the portfolio of the foreign bank that serves as its parent 
company.9  
The presence of foreign banks in Eastern Europe has greatly contributed 
to the transformation of domestic financial markets and their catch-up with 
more developed markets in Western Europe. Where as of 1998 financial 
market development of most countries in CEE still lagged behind countries 
at similar GDP levels10, in the early 2000s they reached—and sometimes 
                                            
5 Slovenia and Slovakia have been least affected by the crisis, most likely because they 
were already part of the Euro zone and therefore escaped the twin crisis syndrome of a 
concurrent currency and banking crisis. However, it is also worth noting that as discussed 
below, foreign bank in penetration in Slovenia has been substantially lower than 
elsewhere. 
6 Charles Enoch Credit Growth in Central and Eastern Europe, in The Causes and Nature 
of the Rapid Growth of Bank Credit in the Central, Eastern and South-Eastern European 
Countries), (Charles Enoch & Inci Ötker-Robe eds., 2007) at 3. 
7 Calculated as the fraction of assets of the total banking system’s assets held by the five 
largest domestic and foreign banks per country. See Andre Uhde & Ulrich Heimeshoff 
Consolidation in banking and financial stability in Europe: Empirical evidence, 33 Journal 
of Banking and Finance, 1299 (2009). The ECB confirms a high concentration ratio in 
these countries. See ECB, Banking Structure in the New Member States (European 
Central Bank, 2005). 
8 Uhde & Heimeshoff supra note 7. 
9 Piotr Bednarski & Dariusz Starnowski Home and Host Supervisors' Relations: A Host 
Supervisor's Perspective, in Rapid Credit Growth in Central and Eastern Europe: Endless 
Boom or Early Warning? (Charles Enoch & Inci Ötker-Robe eds., 2007). 
10 See Katharina Pistor et al. Law and Finance in Transition Economies, 8 The 
Economics of Transition, 325 (2000). 
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exceeded—these comparative benchmarks.11 What was remarkable and 
yet proved to be unsustainable was the speed with which these changes 
occurred. Within a period of only 5 years (from 2000 to 2005) the credit to 
GDP ratio doubled, and even tripled in several countries.12 According to 
Backe et al., “at the end of 2006, the annual growth rates of credit to the 
private sector ranged from 17% to 64%”13 in Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia 
and Slovenia.14 This data almost certainly understates the real growth of 
credit, as it captures only credit expansion by domestic banks and 
excludes direct cross-border lending by foreign banks to firms and 
households in these countries.15  
When finance in CEE countries dried up as a result of the global financial 
crisis, their governments turned out to be unable to protect their financial 
systems without outside help. The sudden stop of foreign capital inflows 
followed by extensive capital outflows in 2008 and 200916 left the Host 
                                            
11 This has been the case in Bosnia-Hezegowina and Croatia – two small countries that 
are candidates for full members of the EU. See Figure 2.6 in Calin Arcalean et al. The 
Causes and Nature of the Rapid Growth of Bank Credit in the Central, Eastern and 
South-Eastern European Countries, in Rapid Credit Growth in Central and Eastern 
Europe: Endless Boom or Early Warning? 13), (Charles Enoch & Inci Ötker-Robe eds., 
2007) at p. 22. 
12 Enoch in, supra note 6. 
13 Peter Backe et al. Credit Growth in Central and Eastern Europe Revisted § 2007 
(Österreichische Nationalbank 2007). 
14 In the United States, a country with a much larger and deeper financial system, credit 
extended by commercial banks grew by about 11 percent in 2006. See Board of the 
Federal Reserves, Monetary Report to Congress, 19 June 2006, at p. 22. 
15 The Austrian National Bank published data in July 2009, that suggest that in the years 
preceding the crisis direct lending as well as lending via unregulated intermediaries, such 
as leasing companies, increased on average by 20 percent and by over 50 percent in the 
newest member states of the EU (Bulgaria and Romania). See ONB, Finanzmarkt-
Stabilitätsbericht (Österreichische Nationalbank (Austrian National Bank) 2009): “… the 
share of recipient intra-group FIs increased from 65% to more than 70% of total direct 
credit to FIs. These growth rates are inter alia due to the growing importance of leasing 
firms affiliated with Austrian firms.” 
16 Prisoska Nagy “BIS Data on Cross-Border Flows – A Closer Look”, EBRD blog, 11 May 
2009, available at www.ebrdblog.com. 
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system economies in freefall and brought their currencies under attack,17 
and many countries were forced to turn to multilateral organizations for 
help. The IMF has entered into emergency loans with Belarus, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Hungary, Latvia and Ukraine and has concluded standby 
agreements with Poland and Romania. The European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) established a joint action 
program together with the World Bank and the European Investment Bank 
(EIB) in January 2009, committing €24.5 billion to support the banking 
sector in the region. Additionally, the European Central Bank (ECB) has 
reached out to central banks outside the euro area (Sweden, which has 
become exposed to the downturn in the Baltic states where Swedish 
banks have a strong presence, but also Poland and Hungary) to provide 
additional liquidity. 
The hypothetical scenario and its application to the countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe illustrate the shortcomings of the prevailing regime for 
governing transnational finance both within the EU and globally. First, it 
suggests that the allocation of regulatory jurisdiction that is tied to a 
particular from of intermediation—banking—is incomplete. Host-country 
control over subsidiaries is effectively undermined by the ease with which 
transnational financial groups can side-step regulatory controls imposed 
on one vehicle (banks) by channeling capital through other vehicles 
(leasing companies) or by engaging in direct-lending activities to 
customers in foreign markets.18 Second, it ignores the potential for 
                                            
17 Except for those countries in CEE that had already introduced the euro, i.e. Slovenia 
and the Slovak Republic, these countries suffered a classic twin-crisis. 
18 There are obvious parallels to this incompleteness of global financial regulation in 
national regimes. The general trend for resolving this problem has been to move a way 
from institution or entity based regulation (i.e. separate regulation for banks, insurance 
companies, etc.) and to consolidate financial regulation in a single national regulator. See 
Heidi Mandanis Schooner & Michael Taylor United Kingdom and United States 
Responses to the Regulatory Challenges of Modern Financial Markets, 38 Texas 
International Law Journal, 317 (2003) for a comparison of the UK and the US and 
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conflicts of interest between host- and home-country regulators as their 
risk exposure to the activities of these banks diverges. In the above 
example, Home’s regulators were concerned primarily with the 
diversification of their banks, but showed little interest in the systemic 
effects the activities of these banks might have on the stability of the 
foreign markets in which they operated. Yet, what might look like a growth 
market to the parent bank and its regulators can take the form of a credit 
boom and looming bust for regulators in the destination country of 
seemingly benign financial flows.19 Third, the strategy is oblivious to the 
fact that in a highly inter-dependent financial system contagion can spread 
from anywhere (i.e. parent or subsidiary, home or host country) throughout 
the entire system.20 Early detection and prevention should therefore be 
paramount; however, this is difficult to achieve as host- and home-country 
regulators have incomplete information21 the former because they do not 
have access to information about activities of the parent bank that might 
                                                                                                                       
additional comparative evidence from Germany, Australia and Switzerland. The argument 
developed in this paper suggests that consolidation may not be the right answer in all 
cases. Incidentally, countries with consolidated regulators (UK or Switzerland) have not 
faired much better in the crisis than the US with its byzantine governance structure. 
19 See also Richard J. Herring Conflicts between Home & Host Country Prudential 
Supervisors (2007) who illustrates this conflict of interest with the following “nightmare 
scenarios” in which a foreign entity with a large share of local (i.e. host country) markets 
becomes “systematically important, while at the same time, being so small relative to the 
parent group that it is not regarded as significant to the condition of the parent company”; 
in this case, the home country regulator may not see a case for intervention as it is 
naturally concerned with the stability of the financial group for its’ own market, not with 
the stability of the financial system of countries in which that group operates a subsidiary. 
20 Allen and Gelb use a formal model to suggest that only a fully integrated, or complete, 
financial system can avoid contagion problems of this kind. See Franklin Allen & Douglas 
Gale Financial Contagion, 198 Journal of Political Economy, 1 (2000). For empirical 
evidence compare Graciela L. Kaminsky et al. The Unholy Trinity of Financial Contagion, 
17 Journal of Economic Perspectives, 51 (2003). 
21 Under EU guidelines and Basel equivalents, host country regulators depend on home 
country regulators for receiving relevant information. See, for example, the CEBS 
Guidelines for Cooperation between Consolidated Supervisors and Host Supervisors, 25 
January 2006, according to which the parent company in charge of consolidated regulator 
has unfettered access to all relevant information; in contrast, “essential information and, if 
deemed useful, relevant information is provided to all supervisors at an appropriate level”. 
Ibid at 15. 
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affect their markets; and the latter because they do not have sufficient 
information about how the totality of activities of their banks might affect 
foreign markets. 
The described risk properties of inter-dependent financial markets call for 
an approach to regulation other than the choice between home versus 
host country regulation on one hand, or national vs. supra-national 
regulators on the other. The choice between home and host country 
regulation offers a wrong alternative where in fact both home and host 
country regulation is required to fully take account of the different risks 
associated with financial interdependence. Home country regulators will 
focus on the stability of financial institutions—including financial groups 
with regional or global reach in light of the repercussion their failure might 
have on the home market; their interests are primarily entity-focused and 
based on the assumption that the stability of the financial entity is strongly 
correlated with the stability of the bank’s and the regulator’s home market. 
Even if true, this correlation is not sufficient enough to protect the host 
country, and it’s market may suffer from actions taken by parent banks 
that may not have any repercussions for the stability of the parent or its 
home market. Home country regulators have few incentives to fully 
internalize these host-country specific risks, because they do not bear the 
costs of a crisis in that country. Rather, a crisis in host countries can be 
(and as the history of emerging market crises suggests22 typically is being) 
                                            
22 This is true for the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s as well as the series of 
emerging market financial crises of the 1990s from Mexico’s tequila crisis in 1994, to the 
1997/8 East Asian financial crisis and the related crises in Russia and other former 
socialist countries; as well as the most recent crisis in Argentina in 2001. These crises 
were all fueled by foreign financial intermediaries, yet the clean up was left to the IMF and 
other multinationals. For an overview of the role of multinational organizations in resolving 
these crises, see Martin Feldstein Economic and Financial Crises in Emerging Market 
Economies: Overview of Prevention and Management, NBER Working Paper 8837, 
(2002); Ngaire Woods Understanding Pathways Through Financial Crises and the Impact 
of the IMF: An Introduction, 12 Global Governance, 373 (2006); Charlie Calomiris Capital 
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sourced out to multilateral lending agencies—such as the IMF or the 
EBRD—as has proven the case with CEE countries during the global 
financial crisis. 
The standard solution to this misalignment of costs and regulatory 
jurisdiction is the centralization of regulatory powers. By creating a supra-
national regulator that undertakes to supervise financial groups operating 
in more than one country it is presumed that regulation can be optimized.23 
The tendency to attempt resolving conflicting regulatory objectives by way 
of vertical integration is pervasive: Even if in general decentralized or local 
policy spaces are preferred over centralization—as embodied, for example 
in the subsidiarity principle of the Treaty on European Union— whenever 
inter-community spillovers occur (that is in the case of externalities) a 
move upwards in the hierarchy towards a federal or centralized solution is 
advocated as the natural solution.24 Some properties of cross-border 
finance are indeed akin to the externality problems associated with 
environmental regulation: the classic case of externalities in search of 
central solutions.25 As thus, the excessive ‘emission’ of finance into a 
previously closed or less developed market can trigger a crisis. Similarly, 
both parent banks and home regulators may have incentives to externalize 
the costs of their actions to host countries. 
                                                                                                                       
Flows, Financial Crises and Public Policy, in Globalization, What's New? , (Michael M. 
Weinstein ed., 2005). 
23 For a summary of these frameworks and the application to environmental regulation, 
corporate law, and banking regulation, see Richard L. Revesz Federalism and 
Regulation: Extrapolating from the Analysis of Environmental Regulation in the United 
States, 3 Journal of International Economic Law, 219 (2000). 
24 See Robert P. Inman & Daniel L Rubinfeld Rethinking Federalism, 11 Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 43 (1997) for a summary and analysis of different federalism 
theories. 
25 See Revesz supra note 23. 
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Still, some important qualifications should be made to the suggestion that 
centralization is optimal in case of spillovers in the area under 
investigation: First, unlike victims of polluters, recipients of cross-border 
financial flows can exclude and regulate financial flows to their territory—
capital controls being the obvious solution and regulation a finer tuned 
version thereof;26 Second, capital flows are in principle benign, thus 
questioning the efficacy of standardized emission controls for the entire 
policy space—Indeed, they tend to produce beneficial outcomes in the 
country of destination if adequately regulated, and only when left 
unchecked do they destabilize the recipient country’s financial system. 
Whether or not this negative scenario occurs depends not simply on the 
volume of capital channeled to a market of destination, the type of 
investment (whether portfolio investment or foreign direct investment) or 
the transmission channels used, but also on the effect capital flows will 
have given pre-existing local conditions in the country of destination, or on 
its “absorption capacity”27 —This mismatch problem between capital flows 
and absorption capacity cannot be easily resolved by consolidating 
regulatory authority with a central federal or global agent, which is unlikely 
to have access to or be able to process of relevant information to make 
the relevant judgment calls—Instead, a set of differentiated regulations 
may be required that are tailored to capture different risks associated with 
transnational financial intermediation: the risk to the intermediary itself and 
the risk to the different domestic markets in which they  operate;Third, the 
centralization of regulatory tasks does not eliminate conflicts of interest or 
                                            
26 There is a substantial literature that questions the efficacy of capital controls, although 
much of it focuses capital outflows (or flights). However, there is also substantial 
evidence that capital controls when judiciously applied can have beneficial effects. See 
only Barry Eichengreen & David Leblang Capital Account Liberalization and Growth: Was 
Mr. Mahathir Rights?, 8 International Journal of Finance and Economics, 205 (2003). 
27 See Eswar Prasad et al. Foreign Capital and Economic Growth, 2007 Brookings 
Papers on Economic Activity, 153 (2007) who develop this concept in trying to explain 
patterns of global capital flows. 
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fully internalize the costs of under- or over-regulation of financial markets. 
Only if markets are fully integrated and the costs of market or regulatory 
failure are equally distributed will that be the case. Absent such conditions  
(and even in the relatively highly integrated European financial market 
they are still absent), conflicts will have to be resolved either within a 
single agency; or alternatively, among different de-centralized regulators.28  
An additional benefit typically associated with centralization is the 
avoidance of a race-to-the-bottom whereby several host countries in 
competition with each other seek to attract foreign capital by lowering 
regulatory standards. The race-to-the-bottom argument is often invoked in 
policy debates, yet exit is much less common than often assumed and is 
dependent on industry specifics.29 Races tend to be more common when 
physical relocation is not required to reap the benefits of a more 
accommodating regulatory regime and/or when relocation is cheap and 
the new regulatory regime can be exported to the markets where the 
company wishes to operate.30 Thus, in the United States federal legislation 
providing that credit card companies chartered in any state could do 
business throughout the entire federation under the rules of that state31 
has triggered a race-to-the-bottom. Several states positioned themselves 
to attract credit card companies by offering low regulatory standards (in 
the form of usury laws, low disclosure requirements and the like) in all 
                                            
28 An example for this is the consumer protection agency advocated by the Obama 
administration as part of their reform proposal for the financial market. See the proposed 
“Consumer Financial Protection Agency Act of 2009” available at www.treasury.gov. 
29 Bruce G. Carruthers & Naomi R. Lamoreaux Regulatory Races: The Effect of 
Jurisdictional Competition on Regulatory Standards (2009) discussing labor, financial and 
environmental regulatory races within the United States. 
30 Ibid at 29. 
31 Samuel Isacharoff & Erin F. Delaney Credit Card Accountability, 73 The University of 
Chicago Law Review, 157 (2006) on the National Bank Act of 1964 (12 USC § 85 (2000)) 
and subsequent acts of Congress, including the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and 
Branchising Efficiency Act (12 USC § 1811 (2000)) and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (Pub 
L No 106-102, 113 Stat 1338, 1999). 
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states in which they operated and in doing so have effectively lowered the 
safeguards for borrowers and consumers nationwide.32 This race-to-the-
bottom scenario has the specific feature of allowing parent banks to shop 
for the state that offers the most convenient regulation and to use this 
state’s set for banking operatives not only within said state, but in it’s 
actions nationwide. In other words, it combines regulatory jurisdiction 
based on domicile with universal jurisdiction. The European passport 
accomplishes the same feat by allowing banks, insurance companies and 
other financial intermediaries to operate across the European Union once 
they have been authorized by a single regulator: The crucial difference 
that sets the US example apart is that universal scope of a single 
regulatory regime is conditioned on mutually agreed minimum regulatory 
requirements. How important this difference is in practice depends on 
whether the mutually agreed upon minimum regulatory standards 
adequately address all relevant risks. To the extent they don’t, the same 
regulatory race-to-the-bottom as described in the example of US credit 
card agencies may ensue. 
The combination of freedom to choose one’s domicile with universal 
application of that domicile’s legal regime which is race-conducive should 
be distinguished from cases where all competing jurisdictions have to offer 
is access to their own markets. This makes a race-to-the-bottom scenario 
much less likely, or at least less likely for bigger states, or states that offer 
other comparative advantages that make them too big or too important for 
transnational financial intermediaries to pass on.33 In contrast, smaller 
                                            
32 Ibid. 
33 China is the most obvious example. For a discussion of the concession Western banks 
have been willing to make in order to enter the Chinese financial market, see Katharina 
Pistor Banking Reforms and Bank Bail Outs in the Chinese Mirror, in China's Transition to 
a Market Economy, (Joseph Stiglitz ed., China's Transition to a Market Economy, 2010 
forthcoming). 
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countries may lose out in the competition for global capital if they impose 
host country regulations that are perceived to be overtly costly. 
Transnational groups may decide to bypass them if they impose regulatory 
burdens that are not worth the costs in light of the expected benefits these 
markets have to offer. This, however, does not refute the notion of effect-
based host regulation. Effect-based regulation gives host countries an 
option to exercise regulatory jurisdiction in the event that their financial or 
economic system might be inadvertently affected by a financial 
intermediary’s actions, which they may choose to exercise or not. They 
may even commit ex ante not to exercise this option. That act alone 
should focus their minds on the fact that they are effectively relinquishing 
the responsibility to safeguard their domestic financial systems and they 
may therefore ask for some assurance vis-à-vis the intermediary or their 
home country regulators in return.34 The home-host regulatory regime 
accomplishes the same outcome, but without the awareness or the 
political costs associated with an explicit abdication of regulatory power. 
This analysis results in two conclusions: . First, centralization or vertical 
integration is not a panacea for resolving conflicting interests between 
home and host countries, customers and financial service providers, et 
cetera. Second, the benefits of centralization do not necessarily outweigh 
the costs of a decentralized system with partially overlapping jurisdictions 
that pursue different regulatory goals. While standardization of regulation 
may reduce the costs for firms ex ante, the total costs of incomplete ex 
ante regulation and ex post bail out may far exceed these benefits, 
moreover, such centralization tends to come at the expense of 
                                            
34 For a more detailed exposition of this point see Katharina Pistor Into the Void: The 
Governance of Finance in Central and Eastern Europe (Gerard Roland ed., Reflections 
on Transition Twenty Years after the Fall of the Berlin Wall, 2010, forthcoming). 
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information.35 Regulatory centralization is likely to reduce the collection 
and processing of localized information thus exposing the system to the 
vulnerabilities of local and unrecognized crises spreading throughout the 
system; thus, any compromise between a fully integrated centralized 
model and a more decentralized regime has to take into account that the 
need to collect information locally and to assess its local and system-wide 
implications will entail maintenance and coordination costs. As suggested 
earlier, effective coordination requires ‘voice’ and this presupposes 
leverage. The current home-host regulatory regime disarms host country 
regulators. By contrast, effect-based regulation is meant to level the 
playing field. 
3. Towards Effect-Based Regulation 
The deficiencies of the existing regulatory regime for global finance could 
be counteracted by centralizing regulation at the global level, or, 
alternatively, by devolving regulatory powers to (multiple) local agents. 
This paper advocates the latter solution not only for political reasons but 
also on grounds of efficacy:  Within the EU a centralized regulator might 
be feasible at some point in the future (although, interestingly, the global 
crisis has not been sufficient to achieve consensus on this36), however, at 
the global level such an arrangement is unlikely (and given the size and 
diversity of global financial markets would be impractical). A centralized 
regulator would face substantial challenges: it would have to regulate and 
supervise a vast number of highly complex financial intermediaries that 
offer a range of financial services across multiple and divergent markets. 
Yet, effective regulation of financial intermediaries requires proximity to the 
regulated entities and/or activities so as to facilitate the conduct of regular 
                                            
35 On this point see James C. Scott Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to 
Improve the Human Conditions Have Failed (Yale University Press, 1998). 
36 See also the discussion of the new EU reform proposals under 4 below. 
 18 
audits, to sanction noncompliance, and to resolve looming crises before 
they spread throughout the system. A centralized regulator would 
therefore have to rely extensively on regulators in places where these 
services are rendered. Rather than operating as an autonomous global 
regulator, such an agency would instead need to coordinate the different 
regulatory activities of national regulators. This kind of coordination may 
well be needed, but it does not require shifting the regulatory and 
supervisory powers to a central agent; to the contrary, such a reallocation 
of oversight functions may well undermine the vigilance of local agents. 
Neither could a centralized regulator replace cooperation among domestic 
regulators. A quick response system is more effective if information is 
shared directly by agents that have the means and the incentives to 
respond with the appropriate level of urgency than if information has to 
travel upwards to a central authority and commands have to be issued by 
the center to local actors.37  
The key challenge for effective regulation of global financial markets is to 
ensure effective de-centralized regulation where this is possible and to 
enhance cooperation among multiple regulators. The challenge in 
designing such a system is the allocation of regulatory powers and 
responsibilities among regulators in a way that internalizes the costs of 
potential future financial crises, including crises that might originate within 
their territory and those that may originate elsewhere. While it may not be 
possible to fully optimize such a system, it does seem a feasible model for 
improving upon what we have. An effective governance regime would 
have to meet at least two conditions: First, it would need to better align 
                                            
37 This insight is well established in organizational theory. See for example Yingyi Qian et 
al. Coordination and Experimentation in M-Form and U-Form Organizations, 114 Journal 
of Political Economy, 366 (2006), who develop a formal model that suggests that 
innovation is more likely in M-Form organizations that link decentralized actors directly to 
one another, than in U-Form organizations, in which information and commands have to 
be channeled through a centralized authority.  
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regulatory responsibilities with the allocation of costs associated with 
regulatory failure; and Second, it should enhance rather than reduce the 
propensity for cooperation among regulators. 
The current regime is deficient on both grounds: The allocation of 
regulatory responsibilities between home and host country under Basel 
Concordat and even more so under existing EU regulations largely does 
not take full of account of the propensity for conflict between home and 
host country regulators.38 The Basel Concordat—even in its most recent 
iterations—works from the assumption that the core of financial activities 
of a given intermediary take place in its home jurisdiction and that foreign 
activities comprise only a small share of its activities and thus only 
marginally affect the financial system of host countries. This explains the 
strong emphasis on home country regulation—which has grown rather 
than diminished over the past several years.  However, the experience of 
CEE countries (and others) during the credit boom and the subsequent 
bust demonstrates that foreign markets have become critical growth 
markets for banks from over-banked countries and that despite regulatory 
efforts, foreign banks can come to dominate if not control entire domestic 
financial systems. If anything, the European regulatory regime is even 
more focused on home country regulation than the Basel Concordat. The 
European passport system eliminates entry control except for 
                                            
38 Earlier versions of the Basel Concordat mention the potential for conflict, but over time 
the role of home country regulators has been strengthened. The 1983 version talks about 
“complementary and overlapping” regulatory responsibilities between home and host 
country regulators. The 1992 version places the burden to challenge the proposed 
division of labor, which favors home country regulation on the host country by stipulating 
that “Inaction on the part of either authority will be construed as an acceptance of the 
division of responsibilities established in the Concordat”. Thus, each authority is 
responsible for making a deliberate choice between accepting its responsibilities under 
the Concordat or initiating consultations on an alternative allocation of supervisory 
responsibilities for the case at hand”, section 2 at page 4. The different versions are 
available at www.bis.org.  
 20 
subsidiaries,39 which according to the Basel Concordat is a critical juncture 
at which home and host country regulators can review the viability of a 
financial intermediary’s ambitions for external expansion and establish 
channels of communication among themselves. European directives even 
provide for delegated supervision, wherein a host country fully delegates 
financial supervision over foreign-owned subsidiaries on its territory to the 
home country regulator of the parent; so far, however, not a single host 
country has used this provision – much to the dismay of the financial 
industry.40 However, EU hard and soft law emphasizes the lead role of 
home country regulators in the case of consolidated regulation41; and the 
EU home-host guidelines42 developed by the Committee of European 
Bank Supervisors, or CEBS, in consultations with stakeholders from the 
financial industry leave only a subordinate role for host country 
regulators.43 Both the Basel Concordat and the relevant EU directives and 
guidelines emphasize the need for coordination between home- and host- 
                                            
39 It requires only notification in case of a branch or when a foreign bank from another 
member states extends financial services within its territory for the first time. See 
Directive 2006/48/EC Relating to the “Taking up and Pursuit of the Business of Credit 
Institutions” of 14 June 2006, OJ L177/1, 30.6.1006 (hereinafter Credit Institutions 
Directive, DCI) Arts. 25.1 and 28.1, respectively. 
40 See the comment by the European Banking Federation (FBE) to the CEBS proposed 
home-host guidelines laid down in Consultation Paper CP09: “In this context, the 
delegation of tasks and responsibilities is central to the home/host framework. We 
appreciate the emphasis on this in CP09. Article 52 (9) of Directive 2000/12/EC (Article 
131 in the revised Directive) already provides for the delegation of supervisory 
responsibilities. We are however concerned that this provision has never been utilised to 
date. We therefore urge CEBS to explore the use of this provision to the fullest possible 
extent under the new framework.” Available at http://www.c-ebs.org/getdoc/0d883044-
b483-4b45-a1f7-76b9e36b8b59/Responses-to-CP09.aspx. 
41 See Arts. 125, 126 and 129 DCI 2006. 
42 CEBS Guidelines on Supervisory Cooperation for Cross-Border Banking and 
Investment Firm Groups, CEBS CP09, 8 July 2005, available at www.c-ebs.org 
43 Specifically, they are advised to seek other than essential information about foreign 
subsidiaries operating on their territories primarily from home country supervisor. See 
CP09 supra note 43 recital 45 at 15.  
 country regulator of the parent rather than the subsidiary or its parent. See CEBS Home-
Host Guidelines supra note 43 recital 45 at 15. 
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country regulators especially in times of crisis. Nonetheless, the described 
(mis-)allocation of regulatory responsibilities creates the possibility for two-
way free riding: Home country regulators can hope to escape the costs of 
their regulatory failure if it materializes abroad, and  host country 
regulators have few incentives to invest in adequate regulation if home 
country regulators are given the lead and are presumed to take it. 
To improve on the current regime it is useful to start with an analysis of the 
costs of regulatory failure that materialize in a financial crisis. These costs 
are born primarily by three constituencies: By the ordinary people in a 
country affected by a financial crisis who lose their savings, jobs, etc.; by 
the taxpayers in countries that have the resources to stabilize their own 
financial system (and possibly those of other countries that might exert 
spill-over effects); and by multilateral organizations such as the IMF which 
help stabilize the financial systems of countries that lack the resources to 
protect themselves and do not receive sufficient bilateral support.44  
In light of this distribution of costs the allocation of regulatory jurisdiction 
should emphasize not entities and their domiciles, but the location where 
the positive and negative effects of financial services can be felt. Such an 
approach is also better suited for the mercurial nature of financial services 
and the risks associated with them. In the past, the failure of deposit taking 
banks has been the major concern for regulators because of the systemic 
effect such a failure might have on the market in which that bank is 
                                            
44 Note that the IMF finances itself not only from member contributions in the form of 
special drawing rights, but also from interests charged on loans. Indeed, in the 1990s, 
most of the revenue was generated from loans, implying that the countries at the 
receiving end of IMF funding were financing the organizations. When countries chose to 
pay back their loans to the IMF early and to avoid the IMF when in need of external 
finance, the IMF was forced to lay off a significant part of its staff. See Ngaire Woods & 
Domenico Lombardi Uneven patterns of governance: how developing countries are 
represented in the IMF, 13 Review of International Political Economy, 480 (2006) for a 
review of how developing countries are financing yet remain under-represented at the 
IMF. 
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located. However, the maturity transformation function that is at the heart 
of banks’ inherent vulnerability to failure is shared by other entities that 
face short-term claims but invest in long(er) term assets. The failure of 
Bear Stearns and Lehmann in 2008 illustrates that non-deposit taking 
institutions can face a ‘bank run,’ not only by their depositors but by their 
short-term lenders-many of them fellow banks that participate in the inter-
bank lending market. Fears of illiquidity and doubts about the viability of 
available collateral can bring down a single participant in this inter-
connected market and fears about widespread illiquidity can topple the 
entire system. Thus, risk exposure is determined not primarily by the 
domicile of an entity but by a system’s exposure to systemic risk.45 It 
follows accordingly that the entity-based regulatory model with its strong 
bias in favor of home country regulation which was the inspiration for the  
Basel Concordat and the EU regulatory regime is outdated. 
The risk assessment and judgment call for an appropriate response to an 
actual or perceived risk should be left with regulators that are accountable 
to the constituencies46 that will bear the costs when the uncontained risk 
materializes. While it is true that Iceland’s banks collapsed together with 
their customers in the UK, the Austrian and Swedish banks weathered the 
downturn of international credit markets by cutting back their exposure to 
the markets in Central and Eastern Europe.47 Cutting their losses and 
                                            
45 Systemic risk refers to the propensity that a local event may trigger a domino-like effect 
for an entire system. For a comprehensive account of the meaning of systemic risk see 
Steven L. Schwarcz Systemic Risk, 97 Georgetown Law Journal, 193 (2008). 
46 There is an extensive literature questioning the accountability of regulators. See only 
George Stigler The Theory of Economic Regulation, Bell Journal of Economics, (1971). 
Yet, unless one is of the view that this problem is inherent to any form of regulation, it is 
secondary to the question of who should regulate. This paper focuses on the latter 
question; the former will be addressed in future research. 
47 To be fair, they did this only after the true scale of the global economic crisis had been 
exposed and at least some of them received bailout money from taxpayer with conditions 
that prevented the use of these resources to stabilize foreign subsidiaries. At the 
beginning of the unfolding crisis, foreign parent bank cross-subsidized subsidiaries in 
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consolidating their business was sound business practice from their 
perspective. Yet, the existence of national borders that separate their 
policy space and scope of accountability from that of markets that 
provided their banks with unprecedented growth opportunities allowed the 
banks to externalize the costs of what proved to be unsustainable 
expansion strategies. By the same token, their home regulators could 
pride themselves in stabilizing their own banking system by ensuring that 
they were adequately capitalized for their activities in the home market, 
but left the clean-up job in Central and Eastern Europe to multilateral 
organizations. In the words of the Austrian central bank, “in light of recent 
rescue measure by the IMF and the EU Commission, extreme scenarios 
[i.e. those that would have required further intervention by the ONB, the 
author] have become much less likely”.48 This quotation illustrates two 
related key problems in the existing regime: The misallocation of 
regulatory responsibility and the lack of accountability for failure to 
regulate in markets beyond the home regulator’s jurisdiction: The 
regulators in Reykjavik, Stockholm and Vienna concerned themselves 
primarily with the stability of the banks they regulated, but had little interest 
in the stability of the markets in which their banks had come to play a 
dominant role. It was only in response to the crisis that the Austrian 
Central Bank launched an investigation into the lending practices of 
Austrian banks in neighboring countries regarding the circumvention of 
attempts by domestic regulators in those countries to fuel the credit boom. 
Even then, the primary concern was legality of the banks’ actions (and 
most where deemed legal, which they probably were) rather than stability 
concerns with respect to the foreign market affected by the lending 
                                                                                                                       
Eastern Europe. See Ralph De Haas & Iman Van Lelyveld Internal Capital Markets and 
Lending by Multinational Bank Subsidiaries, Journal of Financial Intermediation 19:1 
(2010) 1-25. 
48 See ONB supra note 15 at 9. 
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boom.49 Instead, the countries that were affected by the strategies 
financial intermediaries from Iceland, Austria or Sweden pursued in their 
markets should have been responsible for taking actions to mitigate these 
risks. After all, people in these countries are bearing the ultimate costs of a 
financial crisis. 
This calls for an effect-based allocation of regulatory responsibilities: a 
domestic regulator should have jurisdiction over practices of financial 
intermediaries that have a material affect on the stability of their home 
market irrespective of the nature of the entity that undertakes these 
actions (a bank or a non-bank); whether or not the entity is domiciled 
within their jurisdiction; or whether the action is taken domestically or 
abroad. Effect based jurisdiction should complement—not replace--entity -
based home-country regulation. 
Two major objections can be raised against effect-based regulation in the 
area of financial services. First, such a regulatory system would impose 
excessive regulatory burden on globally active financial intermediaries and 
thereby undermine the process of financial globalization. Second, it may 
undermine rather than foster cooperation among regulators from different 
countries. With respect to the first argument it would seem that the global 
crisis has shifted the burden of proof to those who continue to advocate 
the benefits of unfettered global capital flows subject primarily to entity-
based self-regulation.50 Facing more than one regulator will increase the 
                                            
49 The shift in lending strategy often increased the risk for the recipient markets, as direct 
loans tended to be denominated in Euros of Swiss francs rather than local currencies. 
50 This line of argument is most aggressively pursued by the Institute for International 
Finance, a lobbying organization for multinational financial intermediaries. See IIF, Final 
Report of the IIF Committee on Market Best Practices: Principles of Conduct and Best 
Practice Recommendations 2008), which advocates self-regulation as the primary 
response to the global crisis; and IIF, Restoring Confidence, Creating Resilience: An 
Industry Perspective on the Future of International Financial Regulation and the Search 
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transaction costs of multinational banks—however from a social welfare 
perspective, benefits will come alongside  these costs. The liberalization of 
financial markets and the emergence of large, multinational intermediaries 
in an increasingly competitive financial market where the search for higher 
yields and thus greater risk has become a major driver of global 
expansion, has contributed to the destabilization of many domestic 
financial systems, and  by implication to the global system. Increasing the 
costs of global expansion could mitigate that risk. Moreover, allocating the 
power to determine the extent to which domestic markets shall be 
exposed to the risk associated with financial liberalization and greater 
financial interdependence should be left with those who bear both the 
costs and benefits of such decisions, i.e. with sovereign nation states. In a 
world of mobile capital, financial intermediaries have the choice to enter 
certain markets. Individual countries should have the choice to determine 
on what grounds they might enter as they bear the costs for these 
decisions. As noted previously, countries with big and potential growth 
markets may have greater leverage, whereas countries with smaller 
markets have less bargaining power. The latter might therefore face 
greater risks, however, these risks do not translate into greater risk for the 
entire system so long as their regulatory regime is denied universal 
jurisdiction. 
Regarding the need to ensure coordination among multiple regulators, 
vesting multiple de-centralized regulators with regulatory powers and 
responsibilities is likely to enhance cooperation among them over the 
current state of affairs. Under the existing regime primary regulatory 
jurisdiction lies with the regulator in whose jurisdiction a bank is licensed. 
Both the Basel Concordat and EU directives call for coordination among 
                                                                                                                       
for Stability (2009), which takes a more nuanced approach in light of the depth and 
spread of the crisis. 
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home and host regulators, while at the same time singling out the home 
regulator for taking the lead. This is also true for the proposed “colleges of 
supervisors”51, which shall include home and host country regulators 
under the leadership of the home country regulator. As suggested earlier, 
this dilutes regulatory responsibility and invites free riding on presumed 
regulatory vigilance by the other side. 
In contrast, effect-based regulation recognizes that host and home country 
regulators may have different, yet partly overlapping, regulatory objectives, 
and at times conflicting ones. Centralizing regulation is appropriate when 
multiple regulatory objectives can be aligned, or a social welfare-
maximizing outcome can be identified ex ante that justifies giving higher 
priority to one objective over another. In this case allocating regulatory 
powers to more than one regulator would indeed lead to inefficient 
duplications. In contrast, separation of regulatory functions is sensible if 
and when regulatory objectives are in conflict with each other and it is 
difficult to determine ex ante, whether pursuing one objective or the other 
will be welfare-enhancing in the long term. The fact that regulatory 
objectives may conflict and that it is difficult for lawmakers and regulators 
to anticipate future contingencies strengthen the case for multiple 
regulators with overlapping jurisdiction. This will at times entail additional 
regulatory costs, as it is unlikely that regulators will reallocate regulatory 
powers among themselves to achieve an efficient outcome. Such a 
Coasian bargain52 faces political and legal constraints; moreover, absent 
conditions that ensure efficient bargaining such an arrangement will not 
                                            
51 Colleges of supervisors are already referred to in Directive 2006/48/EC (see infra) and 
re-appear in the draft Regulation for a European Banking Authority (COM(2009) 499 
final); see ibid Art. 12. 
52 See Ronald H. Coase The Problem of Social Cost, 3 Journal of Law and Economics, 1 
(1960). 
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produce optimal regulation.53 However, this is not the only outcome that is 
conceivable. Instead, regulators can and do coordinate provided they have 
the right incentives to do so. Just as in a Coasian bargaining scenario this 
requires that regulators have something to bargain over, that is, they have 
both power and responsibility. In addition, a facilitator for regulatory 
coordination that does not have a direct stake in the outcome may be 
helpful. 
An important example for coordinated regulation can be found in 
European anti-trust law. European-wide anti-trust matters are vested with 
the European Commission, however, cases that affect only member states 
fall within their respective jurisdictions. In this area effect-based jurisdiction 
is the default allocation of regulatory powers.54 Thus, anti-trust authorities 
assert regulatory authorities that can have an effect on the 
competitiveness of their respective markets irrespective of where the 
conduct occurred or where the entity that is engaging in such conduct is 
located. The German Act against Restraints on Competition specifically 
provides that it applies to all restraints of competition having an effect 
within the territorial scope of the Act, even if they occur outside its 
regulatory  scope.55 Similarly, the UK Competition Act of 1998 prohibits 
anticompetitive agreements, decision, and practices that “may affect trade 
within the United Kingdom…if the agreement, decision or practice is, or is 
                                            
53 See also Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld Making Sense of the Antitrust State-
Action Doctrine: Balancing Political Participation and Economic Efficiency in Regulatory 
Federalism, 75 Texas Law Review, 1204 (1997) who suggest that economic efficiency 
cannot be achieved in most cases by bargaining among decentralized regulators, 
because the conditions – spelled out in Tiebout’s “pure theory of local expenditure” (see 
Charles M. Tiebout A pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 Journal of Political 
Economy, 416 (1956)) are in most cases not fulfilled.  
54 Incidentally, the same is true for the reach of US or European antitrust law, a matter 
that cannot be further pursued within the confines of this paper. 
55 See GWB § 130(2): “Dieses Gesetz findet Anwendung auf alle 
Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen, die sich im Geltungsbereich dieses Gesetzes auswirken, 
auch wenn sie außerhalb des Geltungsbereichs dieses Gesetzes veranlasst werden.” 
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intended to be, implemented in the United Kingdom.”56 It is easy to 
envision that a single case of misconduct can trigger regulatory responses 
by more than one member state, and that such conduct may not only 
violate the domestic law of individual member states but might also 
constitute a violation of Arts. 81, 82 of the EU Treaty. In order to ensure 
effective coordination of member-state conduct in the event that Treaty 
provisions are violated, the EU has constituted a European Competition 
Network with the task of coordinating enforcement actions by different 
member states.57 The Council and the Commission that set forth the 
principles of cooperation among competition authorities have issued a joint 
statement58 acknowledging the co-existence of multiple competition 
authorities whose autonomy and equal status are explicitly recognized. 
The joint declaration strives to ensure the allocation of a case to a single 
regulator that is best capable of dealing with it, but does not allocate 
jurisdiction ex ante; moreover, it also recognizes that such consolidation is 
not always feasible in which the different regulators commit to cooperate 
with each other. 
An important difference between the mentioned examples is that the 
issues at hand for the most part are and can be resolved in an ex post 
fashion, (i.e. after a case that might invoke multiple jurisdictions has 
arisen). In contrast, financial market regulation to be effective needs to be 
proactive, and when a crisis is imminent regulators need to have 
measures in place that can be implemented quickly, as they will have little 
time to coordinate at this stage. This calls for an early response system, 
                                            
56 S. 2(1)(a) and 2(3) UK Competition Act 1998. 
57 The objectives of the ECN are set forth on its web site. See 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/more_details.html. See also Eleanor Fox Competition 
Law, in International Economic Law (418), (Andreas F. Lowenfeld ed., 2008) at 426. 
58 “Joint statement of the Council and the Commission on the Functioning of the Network 
of Competition Authorities” available at  http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/. 
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one that encourages the sharing of information by multiple regulators and 
the coordination of measures aimed at preventing a crisis. The questions 
to be addressed in the following section are whether such a system 
already exists in the EU de lege lata, whether the reform proposals 
currently under discussion contemplate such a system, and if not, whether 
such a system anchored in effect-based regulation would be compatible 
with the Treaty and/or existing secondary EU law. 
4. Legality of Effect Based Regulation in the EU 
The existing regulatory regime for financial intermediation is rooted in 
Treaty provisions guaranteeing the free movement of services, including 
financial services and the free movement of capital. Specifically, Art. 56 
(Art. 49 TEC) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU59 prohibits 
restrictions on the freedom to provide services within the Community, and 
Art. 63 (Art. 56 TEC) outlaws all restrictions on the free movement of 
capital not only among member states of the Community, but also vis-à-vis 
third countries. While the scope of these Treaty provisions is broad, it is 
not without limits. Member states retain the authority to regulate financial 
services and capital flows for tax purposes, purposes of prudential 
regulation, and to protect public policy (or common good) concerns.60 As 
such, the Treaty provisions are therefore compatible with notions of effect-
based regulation, as it can be regarded as but one assertion of member 
state sovereignty to protect its public interests. Nonetheless, the scope of 
                                            
59 OJ  C115/1 (2008), at 49. 
60 Specifically, Art. 58 (2) EU Treaty provides that member states are free “to take all 
requisite measures to prevent infringements of national law and regulations, in particular 
in the field of taxation and the prudential supervision of financial institutions, or to lay 
down procedures for the declaration of capital movements for purposes of administrative 
or statistical information, or to take measures which are justified on grounds of public 
policy or public security.” In addition, Art. 60 opens the possibility that in emergency 
cases member states may act unilaterally impose capital controls if the Council has not 
taken relevant actions. 
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member state regulatory autonomy has been curtailed by two factors: 
First, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has over the years heightened 
the standards for public policy defenses in an attempt to lend greater 
credence to the principles of economic freedom enshrined in the Treaty of 
Rome. Second, the EU has established a framework for regulating 
financial intermediaries that encompasses directives designed to 
harmonize regulatory standards as well as to coordinate mechanisms at 
the European level in the form of EU-wide committees for ensuring the 
specification of such standards for regulatory purposes and their 
consistent implementation. Both trends effectively curtail member states’ 
abilities to resort to effect-based regulation other than in exceptional 
circumstances or in areas not specifically covered by existing secondary 
law. Reform proposals currently under discussion do not seek to reverse 
these trends; rather, they are aimed at strengthening the centralization of 
regulatory control at the European level with only nominal participation of 
affected member states in the colleges of supervisors. 
The European Court of Justice’s case law has long asserted that the four 
freedoms embodied in the Treaty of Rome are directly applicable and do 
not require the enactment of secondary legislation to be enforceable. A 
requirement by a member state that a provider of financial services - in 
this case an insurance provider - has to create an establishment in a 
member state before being allowed to offer services there amounts, 
according to the ECJ, to a violation of the free movement of services and 
capital and can be justified only on grounds of common good.61 The Court 
acknowledged that the growth of the insurance market, the mass selling of 
products, and the difficulties customers encounter in deciphering products 
and assessing their costs can justify regulatory interventions by host 
                                            
61 See Commission v. Germany, Case 205/84 of 4 December 1986, European Court 
Reports 1986 page 03755, recitals 28, 29. 
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states. However, such interventions must be proportionate—that is—the 
host state must show that the rules of protection in the home state of the 
insurance provider are not adequate and that the host country regulations 
imposed are necessary in that respect.62 In assessing the level protection 
provided in a given host state, the ECJ takes into account secondary 
Community law aimed at standardizing minimum protection throughout the 
Community. In 1984 the ECJ ruled with respect to the insurance sector, 
that critical aspects of regulating the insurance sector, including technical 
reserve requirements, were not yet harmonized, and that a case could be 
made that such standards are critical for protecting consumers. A host 
country may therefore fill this void and establish such requirements if it can 
show that the insurance provider is not subject to similar requirements in 
its home country.63 In the end, the court held that the requirement to 
establish a full presence in a host state was not shown to have been 
necessary to achieve these goals, but that the host country had less 
onerous means at its disposal. By implication, the Court confirmed the 
right of a member state to impose regulations if they can be justified on 
common good grounds, particularly in cases where community law 
remains incomplete. 
In a more recent case, the ECJ had to rule on the legality of Germany 
prohibiting a Swiss financial intermediary from offering Internet loans to 
German customers.64 The Court first affirmed that such host country 
restrictions on foreign financial intermediaries restrict the free movement 
of capital and services. In the words of the ECJ:  
                                            
62 Ibid, recital 35. 
63 Ibid, recital 47. 
64 Fidium Finanz, Judgment of the ECJ in C-452/04, OJ C294/9, 2.12.2006. 
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“It is settled case-law that all measures which prohibit, impede or render 
less attractive the exercise of the freedom to provide services must be 
regarded as restrictions of that freedom (…). If the requirement of 
authorization constitutes a restriction on the freedom to provide services, 
the requirement of a permanent establishment is the very negation of that 
freedom. For such a requirement to be accepted, it must be shown that it 
constitutes a condition which is indispensable for attaining the objective 
pursued.”65 
In the end, the ECJ did not decide the question that would have been 
critical for “Host’s Dilemma”, which is, whether a member state may invoke 
the common good principle to constrain capital flows against the 
background of secondary community legislation that has greatly expanded 
in scope and level of protection. It argued that a Swiss firm could not 
invoke the principle of free movement of services, as Switzerland is not a 
member of the EU. While member states are obliged under the Treaty to 
eliminate all constraints on the free movement of capital even vis-à-vis 
third states (Art. 56) that provision did not help the Swiss firm, because the 
Court argued that credit provisioning was at its core a financial service and 
that any restriction on the free movement of capital was incidental to 
regulating financial services.66 Nonetheless, the case is relevant in that it 
affirms that regulations of financial intermediation by member states are 
construed as a per se violation of the freedom of services. Member states 
must show that such restrictions are indispensable for protecting the 
common good. 
Existing community law in the area of financial services affirms these 
principles. Thus, the revised Directive on Credit Institutions (DCI 2006) 
                                            
65 Ibid, recital 46. 
66 Ibid, recital 49. 
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obliges member states to ensure that the activities covered by the 
directive “may be carried on within their territories (…) either by the 
establishment of a branch or by way of provision of services by any credit 
institution authorized and supervised by the competent authorities of 
another Member State, provided that such activities are covered by the 
authorization” (Art. 23). This and other directives67 that establish common 
standards for the regulation and supervision of credit institutions form the 
backdrop for this commitment. An entity that is properly authorized by its 
home regulator based on the harmonized standards can freely operate 
within the common economic space without facing additional regulatory 
requirements by host countries. The scope of financial services covered 
by this commitment is expansive. It covers financial services offered by 
credit institutions, i.e. “undertakings whose business is to receive deposits 
or other repayable funds from the public and to grant credits for its own 
account”.68 Appendix I to the DCI 2006 lists 14 types of activities from 
deposit taking over lending and financial leasing to custody services. By 
implication, the regulatory regime, including the allocation of regulatory 
powers between home and host country regulators set forth in the 
directive is deemed applicable to credit institutions that provide these 
services as long as they have been duly authorized by a regulator in one 
of the member states in accordance with this and related directives 
irrespective of where the actual services are rendered. 
The directive allocates regulatory powers between home and host 
countries as suggested by the hypothetical above: Credit institutions that 
have been duly authorized by their home regulatory can open branches or 
offer financial services to customers in other member states upon notifying 
                                            
67 In particular the Directive “On the capital adequacy of investment firms and credit 
institutions”, of 14 June 2006 (recast) OJ L 177/201, 30 June 2006 (hereinafter Capital 
Adequacy Directive). 
68 Art. 4 (1)(a) DCI (2006). 
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host country regulators; they do not need approval from the host 
regulatory. Host countries can seek to enforce violations of home country 
regulation by reprimanding a financial intermediary and informing home 
country regulators about any violations (Art. 30 (1) and (2)). In the event 
that the home country regulator proves unresponsive, the host country 
may take “appropriate measures to prevent or to punish further 
irregularities and, in so far as is necessary, to prevent that credit institution 
from initiating further transactions within its territory” (Art. 30 (3)). 
Furthermore, the host country may “prevent or punish irregularities 
committed within their territories which are contrary to the legal rules they 
have adopted in the interests of the general good” (Art. 31). These 
provisions recognize in principle that host countries can impose regulatory 
supervision based on effect. However, the conditions triggering host 
country regulation are limited to illegal acts of the financial intermediary 
and do not include the power to counter activities that are legal but may 
put the host country’s financial system at risk – such as the simple 
expansion of credit that may, in the eyes of domestic regulators, fuel an 
asset bubble. There is only one carve-out: host regulators retain “in 
cooperation with the competent authorities of the home Member State for 
the supervision of liquidity of the branches of credit institutions”.69 This has 
made it possible for the UK Financial Service Authority (FSA) to announce 
its intention to impose new liquidity standards on UK parents, UK 
subsidiaries of foreign banks as well as foreign bank branches operating in 
the UK.70 While this may open the way for other member state to follow 
suit, this carve-out does not address cases of direct lending or other 
activities not channeled through a branch or subsidiary. As noted above, 
this entity-based approach fails to respond to changes in financial 
                                            
69 Art. 41 DCI (2006). 
70 See FSA proposed rules on strengthening liquidity standards available at 
www.fsa.gov.uk. 
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intermediation—in particular the increasing marketization of financial 
services—which side-steps entities whether they be branches or 
subsidiaries. Indeed, as it currently stands, the directive read in 
conjunction with the freedom of services and capital flows appears to 
preempt a more aggressive application of effect-based regulation. The 
recitals to the directive emphasize that in the interest of developing 
common standards for an integrated financial place the scope of the 
directive should be broadly interpreted. Only specific activities or specific 
kinds of operations not covered in the list of financial services covered in 
the annex to the directive should be subject to supplementary national 
legislation.71 In other words, DCI is the reference for EU-wide common 
regulatory and supervisory standards: member states cannot simply 
invoke their own prudential standards. The DCI even anticipates cases of 
emergency, and in the event of the crisis calls for enhanced cooperation 
between host and home country regulators,72 thus leaving little room for 
argument that deviance from the established allocation of regulatory 
responsibilities on public policy grounds should be possible in times of 
crisis or in order to prevent one. The scope for effect-based extraterritorial 
jurisdiction under existing EU law is therefore limited to financial 
intermediaries and/or services not covered by DCI 2006 (or similar 
directives on other financial services, such as insurance or securities).73 
Since regulatory interventions against foreign financial intermediaries by 
                                            
71 See recital (6) in conjunction with recitals (4) and (5) to the DCI (2006). 
72 See Art. 130 DCI (2006): “When an emergency situation arises within a banking group 
which potentially jeopardizes the stability of the financial system in any of the Member 
States where entities of a group have been authorized, the competent authority 
responsible for the exercise of supervision on a consolidated basis [i.e. the home country 
regulator] shall alert as soon as practicable (….) the [home country] authorities.” 
73 Existing case law that endorses the public policy exception for imposing national 
standards on services conducted elsewhere predates the DCI (2000 and 2006). See, for 
example, Alpine Invest, Case C-384/93 (ECJ reports 1995 I-01141), which was decided 
solely on the basis of the Treaty provisions as the relevant actions predated EU directives 
that might otherwise have been applicable. See ibid, recital 14. 
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definition restrict access to the domestic markets any such measures 
would have to be justified on public policy grounds and, as the case law of 
the ECJ suggests, the threshold for such interventions is high. 
Ongoing reforms of the European governance regime for financial services 
do not follow the effect-based advocated here. Instead, they embrace the 
increased centralization of regulatory functions in the hands of European-
wide regulatory agents. A host of new draft regulation seek to establish a 
“European System of Financial Supervisors” (ESFS) comprising of several 
EU-level supervisors for different types of financial service, such as 
banking, securities, insurance, etc. As part of this scheme, a new 
“European Banking Authority” (EBA)74 will succeed the Committee of 
European Bank Supervisors (CEBS). CEBS was established in 2004 as 
part of the “Lamfalussy Process” for European financial services.75 The 
basic idea of this process named after the chair of the “Committee of Wise 
Men” that authored the report is that EU directives or regulation (level 1) 
shall set forth the general framework for financial market governance. 
Their implementation and enforcement by domestic legislatures and 
regulators shall be guided by complementary guidelines developed by two 
committees. At level 2, the European Banking Committee (EBC), and any 
body run by the European Commission, shall facilitate the implementation 
of directives by addressing political issues as well as design problems. At 
level 3, CEBS brings together regulators from the member states involved 
in the regulation of banks. CEBS was charged with providing technical 
advice and ensuring the consistent implementation of the directive by 
                                            
74 See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
establishing a European Banking Authority, COM(2009) 499 final, Brussels, 23 
September 2009 (hereinafter EBA regulation). 
75 See also Commission adopted Decision 2004/5/EC of 5 November 2003 establishing 
the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (1) as amended of 23 January 2009, 
(2009/78/EC), OJ L 25/23, 29 January 2009. 
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dispersed national regulators. During the first years of its existence CEBS 
has devoted most attention to implementing the second Basel Accord 
(Basel II), which is enshrined in the capital adequacy directive.76 In 
addition to collecting information, conducing peer review, and involving the 
financial industry through consultation processes, CEBS also functions as 
a mediator in disputes between home and host country regulators; The 
complexity of the process and the sheer size of the new committees (51 
regulators from 27 countries are currently represented in CEBS) as well as 
the lack of actual enforcement powers in the hands of CEBS leaves key 
decision-making in the hands of domestic regulators: the regulator in the 
jurisdiction where a credit institution has been authorized (licensed), i.e. 
the home country regulator. A 2009 amendment of the Council decision 
seeks to clarify the objectives of CEBS emphasizing once more its role in 
ensuring cooperation among member state supervisors, facilitating the 
exchange of information among them and operating as mediator in the 
event of disputes.77 CEBS shall be governed by consensus, but if a 
consensus cannot be reached decisions shall be taken by majority vote 
with votes weighted according to relevant Treaty provisions.78 This implies 
that large countries have more votes, which by definition puts most of the 
new member states in CEE (with the exception of Poland) into minority 
position, not only individually but also collectively. The specifics for the 
relation between home and host country supervisors were established in 
guidelines that CEBS adopted in 2005.79 The guidelines were open for 
consultation, which are available from CEBS web page. The responses 
came exclusively from banks and banking associations in old member 
                                            
76 Supra note 69. 
77 Ibid, Arts. 5 and 6. 
78 Ibid, Art. 14 (1). See Art. 205 (2) and (4) EU Treaty, which allocates weights roughly in 
accordance with population size. 
79 CEBS Home-Host Guidelines, CP09 supra note 43.  
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states whose members include important trans-European financial 
conglomerates.80 Not a single organization from the new member states 
submitted a response – perhaps not surprisingly, because in 2005 most of 
the new member states were relatively new, or in the case of Bulgaria and 
Romania had not even become members. Nonetheless, The timing and 
process of the adoption of these guidelines is indicative of the lack of real 
voice of countries, which had already turned themselves into major 
destinations of credit expansion from banking groups with seats in other 
EU member states.81 While one might argue that most of these countries 
would be unlikely to effectuate effect-based regulation should they receive 
such powers, the existing governance structure gives them neither powers 
nor responsibilities to participate in the allegedly coordinative governance 
structure. Such an allocation of powers might be appropriate if the home 
countries of parent banks commit to bail out financial systems of voice-
less host states in the event of a crisis – a commitment hat home country 
regulatory are unlikely to make. 
The reforms triggered by the global financial crisis seek to strengthen EU 
level supervisory bodies rather than national regulators in host countries. 
According to the proposal CEBS will be re-named the “European Banking 
Authority”82 and receive management structure more akin to a full blown 
                                            
80 Specifically, the following organizations commented on the guidelines: Association of 
Foreign Banks in Germany, ING Group , Wirtschaftskammer Österreich - Bundessparte 
Bank und Versicherung, Institute of International Finance (IIF), Belgian Bankers’ & 
Stockbroking Firms’ Association (ABB-BVB), Bundesverband der Deutschen 
Volksbanken und Raiffeisenbanken e.V. (BVR), Bundesverband Öffentlicher Banken 
Deutschlands e.V. (VÖB) and Deutsche Sparkassen- und Giroverband e.V. (DSGV), 
Netherlands Bankers’ Association (NVB), British Bankers' Association (BBA), London 
Investment Bankers’ Association (Liba) and the International Swaps and Derivatives 
Association (ISDA), Eurofinas, European Banking Federation (FBE), French Banking 
Federation (FBF), HVB Group. See http://www.c-ebs.org/getdoc/0d883044-b483-4b45-
a1f7-76b9e36b8b59/Responses-to-CP09.aspx. 
81 See supra the discussion in part 2. 
82 Art. 1 EBA Regulation. 
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regulatory agency with a supervisory board, a management board, a 
fulltime chairperson, and a fulltime executive.83 The board of supervisors 
consists of the chairperson (appointed by it), the head of national 
supervisors of credit institutions, and one representative each of the 
Commission, the European Central Banks (ECB), a newly created 
European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), and non-voting representatives 
from each of the other two European Supervisory Authorities for securities 
and insurance (Art. 25). The supervisory board is charged with realizing 
the EBA’s mission, including the establishment of regulatory standards, 
the development of guidelines and recommendations for their 
implementation, the consistent application of Community legislation, the 
prevention of regulatory arbitrage, the coordination of tasks among 
different regulators and the mediation of conflicts between them (Art. 6). It 
decides with qualified majority applying weighted voting rights in 
accordance with the EU Treaty. The management board has four 
members in addition to the chairperson, all of whom are selected by the 
board of supervisors. The management board is charged with 
implementing the policies set forth by the supervisory board and meets at 
least bi-annually and decides with simple majority of the members present. 
Its two fulltime executives manage everyday affairs of the EBA – the 
chairperson of the supervisory board who officially represents the EBA, 
and the executive who performs day-to-day managerial functions.  
A major function of the EBA is to ensure the consistent application of 
Community law by national regulators.84 In particular, it may take direct 
actions vis-à-vis national supervisors, but also vis-à-vis credit institutions 
                                            
83 See Arts. 25-29 (board of supervisors); Arts. 30-32 (management board); and Arts. 33-
35 on the chairperson. 
84 Art. 9 EBA Regulation.  
 40 
in the event that Community law is not or inconsistently enforced.85 While 
these measures create the impression that the EBA in conjunction with the 
Commission might function as a supranational regulator, the new 
regulatory structure is only as good as existing community law - including 
the guidelines developed by the EBA, and its ability to keep pace with 
market developments. 
While the EBA now has the powers to step into the void should national 
regulators neglect to regulate credit institutions within their jurisdiction, 
their task is limited to enforcing existing Community law, determining 
whether a crisis has arisen and directing national supervisors to take 
actions in accordance with such law. Even in the event of a crisis the EBA 
it is explicitly prevented from taking decisions that “impinge in any way on 
the fiscal responsibility of Member States”.86 Given that emergencies 
typically require bailouts of one sort or another that affect a country’s fiscal 
responsibility, this is a substantial carve out. Last but not least, the efficacy 
of this new agency will depend largely on its resources. According to the 
EBA Regulation, the budget shall comprise of obligatory contributions from 
national financial regulators, a subsidy from the Community, as well as 
fees paid to the Authority.87  
In sum, the EBA is more akin to a supranational regulator than CEBS. In 
fact, the proposed regulation envisions that the EBA might be entrusted 
with “exclusive supervisory powers” over entities and/or activities with 
Community-wide reach.88 Yet, it falls short of the powers, including 
enforcement powers, needed to effectively implement these tasks. 
Moreover, its governance structure arguable entrenches existing 
                                            
85 Art. 6 (2) (d) (e) EBA Regulation.  
86 Ibid, Art. 23. 
87 Art. 48 EBA Regulation. 
88 Art. 6 (3) EBA Regulation. 
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imbalances between large and small countries, home and host countries 
of financial intermediaries. While the chairperson and executives shall be 
independent professionals, they too are appointed by the supervisory 
board, where decision-making power is geared towards de facto home 
countries. Last, but not least, the EBA Regulation further entrenches entity 
based regulation and the system of home-host country division of 
regulatory powers, which has been weakened by the greater marketization 
of financial services. This structure does not bode well for resolving Host’s 
Dilemma. 
5. Concluding Comments 
The existing framework in Europe for governing transnational finance is 
insufficient for addressing the risks countries face that function as 
destinations for expanding multinational financial groups-specifically the 
kind of risks that have materialized in the global financial crisis. There is 
remarkably little evidence that the crisis was caused or deepened because 
of inconsistent application of community legislation. The key problem with 
the existing regime is the misallocation of regulatory powers given the 
distribution of risk and ultimately costs. Instead of addressing these 
problems the reform proposals further entrench the ‘voice’89 of home 
country regulators in EU institutions. What remains for host countries is 
‘loyalty’ and the hope that their interests will be considered more carefully 
in the future in light of the harm a systemic failure of their markets can 
inflict on other member states and the Union. 
                                            
89 As Hirschman has argued, in integrated organizations members have only three 
options: voice, exit or loyalty. When voice is denied and exit is not an option all that 
remains is loyalty. See Albert O. Hirschman Exit, Voice, and Loyalty; Responses to 
Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States (1970). 
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